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Abstract 
 
The US has exceptionally high inequality of disposable household income (i.e., income after 
accounting for taxes and transfers). Among working-age households (those with no persons 
over age 60), that high level of inequality is caused by a high level of market income inequality 
(i.e., income before taxes and transfers), paired with a moderate level of redistribution. In this 
paper, we look more deeply at market income inequality, focusing on its main component – 
labor income – across a group of 24 OECD countries. We disaggregate the working-age 
population into household types, defined by the number and gender of the household’s earners 
and the partnership and parenting status of its members. We concentrate on comparing US 
results with those of the other OECD countries. Our main finding is that high levels of labor 
income inequality in the US cut across diverse subgroups. We conclude that within-group 
inequality of labor incomes in the US is, in almost all groups, high by OECD standards. So it is 
neither an unusual household composition, nor unusually high mean labor incomes of some 
groups (nor indirectly, unusually low levels of redistribution), that explain high US disposable 
income inequality, but instead the fact that high and low labor incomes are universally spread 
across all household/demographic categories. 
    
 
JEL Codes: D31, D33  
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1. Introduction 
 
Laying out the problem: market income inequality versus redistribution  
 
It has been known for at least two decades that disposable income – income after accounting 
for transfers and taxes – is more unequally distributed in the United States than in comparable 
rich economies (Brandolini and Smeeding 2006;  Piketty and Saez 2006;  OECD 2011). Broadly 
speaking, there are two possible underlying explanations. First, market income inequality (i.e., 
income before transfers and direct taxes are taken into account) may be similar in the US as 
elsewhere, but US transfers and taxes are less redistributive, either because the overall size of 
the welfare state is smaller or because the redistribution is less progressive. Second, market 
income inequality may itself be higher in the US than in many other countries, and thus driving 
up the high level of inequality even after redistribution is accounted for. The first explanation 
has generally held sway because market income inequality calculated across households – 
importantly, households of all ages – is not especially exceptional, across the OECD countries, 
while disposable income inequality is substantially greater.  
 
To assess which explanation dominates, we analyze microdata from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) Database, a database with harmonized microdata, based on household surveys (in 
some cases, augmented with administrative data). The LIS Database now includes data from 
over 50 high- and middle-income countries, at nine points in time. For a full description of the 
microdata, see: www.lisdatacenter.org.) In this paper, we use data from LIS’ Wave VIII, which is 
centered on the year 2010, and we include 24 OECD countries1.  
 
Consider Figure 1, in which these 24 OECD countries are ranked by their level of disposable 
income inequality across the entire population – that is, including households with persons of 
all ages.2 Considering disposable income (the darker bars), the US is the second most unequal 
country, just 1 Gini point below the most unequal Israel. The US Gini is almost one-quarter 
greater than the average Gini calculated across these 24 OECD countries. However, when we 
consider inequality of market income (the lighter bars), the situation looks a bit different. 
Inequality of market income, of course, is everywhere greater than inequality of disposable 
income, but US market income inequality is not exceptionally high. This is indicated by the fact 
that the US market income Gini is just slightly (5 percent) higher than the average market 
income Gini, across these countries. It is further confirmed when by the magnitude of 
government redistribution alone (where redistribution is captured as the differences between 
the lengths of the two sets of bars). In the US, transfers and taxes reduce market income 
                                                          
1 Russia is not officially an OECD member state, but a “roadmap to accession” has been approved. For 
convenience, when we use the term “OECD countries” in this paper, we include Russia. 
 
2 Income is adjusted for household size using the following formula: equivalized personal income = 
household income divided by the square root (.5) of the number of household members. This assumes 
economies of scale midway between perfect economies of scale (parameter = 0) and no economies of 
scale (parameter = 1).  
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inequality by 15.5 Gini points, or about 4.5 Gini points less than the average redistribution 
across this group of countries. So, we would conclude that lower redistribution is the dominant 
reason driving the exceptionally high inequality of disposable income reported in the US. 
 
Figure 1. Disposable income inequality and market income inequality,  
in 24 OECD countries, across entire population  
(countries ranked by disposable income inequality) 
 
Note: Ginis based on equivalized incomes, disposable and market, respectively. 
 
However, a closer look at Figure 1 reveals a more complicated result. Note that a number of 
countries have approximately the same magnitude of redistribution as in the US (measured by 
the gap between the two bars): Australia, Italy, Estonia, Canada, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. Why 
they all end up with lower disposable income inequality cannot then be thus entirely explained 
by redistribution but must also be driven by the fact the US enters the process of redistribution 
with comparatively high market inequality. 
 
In a recent paper, Gornick and Milanovic (2015) looked more deeply into this particular issue. 
They began with the insight that market income inequality, when calculated across households 
of all ages, may be depressed – especially relative to many European countries – because 
Americans tend to stay in the labor market until later in life, compared with their counterparts 
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elsewhere. Because the market income in pensioners’ households is often very small or zero, 
the existence of a developed system of social protection paradoxically exaggerates market 
income inequality (among older households) in the rest of OECD and brings the overall market 
income inequality in line with that reported in the US. Thus, the comparatively high level of US 
market income inequality – net of older households – is obscured.  
 
Following the logic of that earlier paper3, we recalculate Figure 1 here, but limited to 
households that contain no persons over age 60.  These results, for “working age” households, 
are shown in Figure 2. When we rank countries by disposable income inequality, the US still 
remains in the second highest position, but now both disposable income inequality and market 
income inequality are comparatively high. Ginis for both are 16 and 22 percent greater than for 
the OECD average. Recall that in Figure 1, we found US market income inequality to be merely 5 
percent higher than in the rest of OECD; now it is 16 percent higher. So clearly now, the “cause” 
of high disposable income inequality is not meager redistribution but high “original” inequality, 
that is inequality of market income (composed of labor and capital income). This is confirmed 
when we look at the redistributive function of the state for people under 60 in the US and 
elsewhere. In the US, redistribution shaves off 10.9 Gini points of market income inequality (the 
difference between the length of the dark and light bars in Figure 2), which is exactly the OECD 
average!  
 
We can thus conclude that, for persons under 60 years of age, weaker US redistribution is not 
the main cause of greater inequality at the disposable income stage. The “problem” is that the 
distribution of “original” labor and capital incomes is substantially more unequal in the US than 
elsewhere, and government redistribution, at the average OECD level, does not compensate for 
the inequality generated in the market.  
 
  
                                                          
3 Gornick and Milanovic (2015) studied 19 countries. Figures 1 and 2 in this paper update their findings, and 
include a somewhat larger group of 24 countries.  
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Figure 2. Disposable income inequality and market income inequality,  
in 24 OECD countries, across working-age population  
(countries ranked by disposable income inequality) 
 
 
Note: Ginis based on equivalized incomes, disposable and market, respectively. 
 
 
Gornick and Milanovic’s (2015) analysis had precursors in the work of Larry Mishel (2015) who 
argued that weaker redistribution in the US could not alone explain the entire disposable 
income inequality gap between the US and the rest of the OECD countries. The underlying 
market income distribution, most importantly the earnings distribution, in the US, they argued, 
is highly unequal in cross-national terms. These analysts pointed to, on the bottom end of the 
earnings distribution, the low US minimum wage and the high prevalence of low-paid jobs, and, 
on the upper end, the extremely high earnings of managers, doctors, lawyers, CEOs and the 
financial sector in general. The exceptionally large gap between CEOs’ salaries in the US and in 
the rest of OECD countries is indeed well-documented (see Piketty, 2014; Mishel and Davies 
2015; Gabaix and Landler, 2008). Indeed, the findings in Gornick and Milanovic (2015) – and in 
Figures 1 and 2 above – confirm that market income inequality is major explanation for 
comparatively high levels of disposable income inequality in the US.   
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The current paper 
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the nature of this higher market income inequality 
in the US. In the analyses that follow, we take the comparative analysis of US market income 
inequality a step further. We do that by disaggregating our findings across subgroups, drawn 
from the larger working-age population. Because the major component of market income is 
labor income, we focus exclusively on it – disregarding income from capital, which is a relatively 
minor component in the market income package of working-age households in these 
countries.4 
 
Focusing on inequality of labor income, we assess inequality that exists both within and 
between various household types (based on the number and gender of earners and on family 
structure), and we compare the results for the US with those in other OECD economies. Our 
objective is to establish whether the greater underlying US market income inequality is the 
result of (a) higher earnings inequality within each of the relevant groups, (b) an unusual 
composition (for example, a high share of groups where earnings inequality is either high or 
low), or (c) large gaps between groups in mean earnings.5 
 
2. Labor income inequality across various household types 
 
In our decomposition, we focus on inequality of labor income. To assess labor income, we use 
the LIS harmonized variable hil (that is, household income from labor) which include earnings 
from all kinds of employment (full-time or “casual”), fringe benefits, non-monetary bonuses 
and self-employment income.6  Since we are interested in how earnings inequality ultimately 
affects disposable income inequality among households, our unit of observation is not an 
individual worker (earner) but the household. Thus total household earnings are summed and 
expressed in equivalent units where the equivalence scale parameter is (as it was in Figures 1 
and 2) set at 0.5, i.e., total household earnings are divided by the square root of the number of 
household members. Thus, we arrive at a variable that measures potential individual welfare 
(assuming equal division of earnings within the households) derived from labor income.  
 
                                                          
4 We emphasize that Figures 1 and 2 report inequality in market income (labor income plus capital 
income), whereas Figure 3, and the rest of the paper, assess labor income only. Among the working-age 
population, and in the countries included here, income from labor accounts, on average, for 97 percent 
of total market income. In no country is the labor income share of market income less than 93 percent.  
 
5 In this paper, we use the terms “labor income”, “earnings”, and “wages” interchangeably.  
 
6 The variable includes: (1) wages and salaries from employment, including the value of goods/services 
received in lieu of cash wages; (2) wages or other income that results from irregular or "casual" 
employment; (3) wage supplements including bonuses and non-monetary benefits such as services paid 
in part or fully by the employer (meals, electricity expenses, automobile expenses, housing expenses, 
etc. where applicable), and (4) self- employment income, including profit/loss from farm production and 
non-farm self-employment business activities. 
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The analysis is conducted only across households whose all members are below 60 years of age 
and who have at least one member reporting income from labor. We carry out the analysis for 
24 economies included in the LIS Database. In all cases, but one, the data are from the year 
2010; the exception is Hungary, for which we have 2009 data. Annex 1 reports the list of 
countries and datasets used. As our measure of inequality, we use the Gini coefficient. The Gini 
is preferred largely because it enables us to easily relate our results about inequality within 
different demographic groups to the well-known Gini values of disposable and market income 
inequality in the US and elsewhere (such as those reported in Figures 1 and 2).  
 
In Figure 3, we report inequality of labor incomes. We find there a result very similar to the one 
in Figure 2, that is, that the English-speaking countries and Israel report noticeably higher 
inequality than in the rest of these OECD countries. The five countries with the most unequal 
earnings distributions (at the household level) are Israel and four Anglophone countries; the US 
is ranked second highest. The labor income Ginis range from between 0.28-0.31 for the highly 
egalitarian Slovakia and Slovenia to 0.44 in the US and Israel. The median and mean labor 
income Gini is about 0.36. This can be compared with the median Gini of market income of 
0.41; the market income Gini would be expected to differ from the labor income Gini because 
the former also includes capital income. The US thus has labor income inequality that is 20 
percent higher than the OECD average (and market income inequality that is 21 percent 
higher). Thus, we establish immediately that market income inequality in the US – based on its 
dominant component, labor income -- is, relative to other OECD standards, on the high end.  
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Figure 3. Inequality of labor income 
in 24 OECD countries, across working-age households, 
(countries ranked by labor income inequality) 
 
 
Note: Ginis based on equivalized labor income.  Source: See Annex 2. 
 
But we still do not know what exactly lies behind that high inequality and for that we need to 
disaggregate the working-age population into several demographic groups (defined below) and 
to look at labor income inequality within each of them. As is well-known, the Gini 
decomposition when the population is divided into different groups is composed of three 
terms: a weighted-sum of within-group inequalities, inequality which is the result of differences 
in mean incomes between the groups, and an overlap (residual) terms that reflects the 
homogeneity of the underlying populations. To understand the meaning of the latter, note that 
when incomes of the groups into which we have divided the population are so different that 
there is absolutely no overlap (e.g., all individuals from a mean-richer group have higher 
incomes than all individuals from a mean-poorer group), the overlap term becomes zero. It 
increases as there is more overlap between the incomes of individuals belonging to different 
groups. The overlap terms moves together with the narrowly defined within-inequality, and we 
shall treat them together. 
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We can write the Gini decomposition across recipients belonging to groups i (1, 2,…r) as  
 
𝐺 =
1
𝜇
∑ ∑(?̅?𝑗 − ?̅?𝑖)
𝑟
𝑗>𝑖
𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗
𝑟
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑖𝐺𝑖 + 𝐿
𝑟
𝑖=1
             (1) 
 
where μ = overall mean income, ?̅?𝑖 = mean income of i-th group, 𝑝𝑖 = population share of i-th 
group, 𝑠𝑖 = share of i-th group in total income, and L = the overlap term. The first term in (1) is 
the between-group inequality, the second term, the narrowly-defined within-group inequality, 
the third, the overlap term. 
 
We can now see that higher overall US labor income Gini (G) may be the result of greater group 
Ginis (Gi), or greater share (si) of groups that have higher inequality of earnings, or finally, may 
be due to large mean income gaps between the groups (that is, to the between-component). In 
Annex 2, we show a formal decomposition of US earnings inequality against earnings inequality 
of other 23 countries, but here we focus first on within-group inequalities. 
 
 
Disaggregating into household types – based on the number and gender of earners 
 
In all countries, we divide the population into six main groups, based on the number and the 
gender of the earners in their households: households that contain (1) one female earner, (2) 
one male earner, (3) one male and one female earner, (4) two female earners, (5) two male 
earners and, finally, (6) three or more earners. Groups (1), (2), and (3) will be further subdivided 
into demographic groups, based on partnership and parenting status.  (Note that, throughout 
this paper, all results are presented at the person level. When we refer to various household 
types, either their prevalence or their outcomes, we are reporting results about the persons 
who live in those household types). 
 
Diagram 1 summarizes our typology of households. Earners are defined as people who report 
having received non-zero labor income during the year. Table 1 reports the composition of the 
working-age population, across the six household types, in these study countries.  
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Diagram 1.  Typology of household types based on number and gender of earners, 
further disaggregated by demographic groups based on partnership and parenting status 
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Table 1. Composition of working-age population, across six main household types 
(where household types are based on the number and gender of earners) 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Country 
1 Female 
Earner 
1 Male 
Earner 
1 Male,  
1 Female 
Earner 
2 Female 
Earners 
2 Male 
Earners 
3+ 
Earners 
Sum of 
columns 
2+3+6 
Australia 9.2 21.6 39.7 2.3 3.6 22.7 83.9 
Canada 9.5 14.7 43.5 2.5 3.2 25.5 83.8 
Czech Republic 8.6 23.3 47.7 1.5 2.2 16.8 87.7 
Denmark 11.8 13.4 47.8 2.1 2.1 22.1 83.3 
Estonia 16.0 20.3 47.4 2.7 1.3 12.3 79.9 
Finland 12.0 15.5 53.1 1.4 0.7 17.2 85.8 
France 14.7 19.7 55.8 1.1 1.4 6.8 82.3 
Germany 14.0 19.7 48.6 1.0 1.7 15.0 83.3 
Greece 8.2 30.9 48.6 0.9 2.3 7.3 86.8 
Hungary 17.6 24.7 39.6 1.6 0.7 9.1 73.4 
Iceland 10.1 11.1 45.3 2.1 1.0 30.4 86.8 
Ireland 18.2 23.6 41.1 2.2 3.9 11.0 75.7 
Israel 10.7 24.1 40.8 1.9 3.1 19.2 84.1 
Italy 10.1 34.0 44.8 0.8 4.0 6.3 85.1 
Luxembourg 10.7 25.0 51.5 0.7 2.3 9.7 86.2 
Netherlands 9.3 15.6 51.7 1.3 2.2 18.8 86.1 
Norway 12.0 15.0 48.3 1.4 1.5 20.2 83.5 
Poland 14.0 28.7 42.3 1.5 3.3 10.2 81.2 
Russia 16.9 17.3 39.6 2.9 2.6 20.7 77.6 
Slovak Republic 8.3 14.4 43.4 1.4 1.9 30.5 88.3 
Slovenia 9.3 15.8 50.6 1.4 1.9 21.1 87.4 
Spain 10.8 25.7 46.6 1.5 2.9 10.0 82.3 
United Kingdom 13.2 21.2 46.6 1.8 2.2 14.7 82.5 
United States 14.8 22.1 42.2 2.3 3.0 15.3 79.6 
Average 12.1 20.7 46.1 1.7 2.3 16.4 83.2 
 
 
As can be expected, three household types (based on earnings configurations) dominate to the 
extent that they include more than 80 percent of all persons in all counties -- except for 
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Hungary, Ireland and Russia.7 The three dominant groups are:  the “traditional”8 two-earner 
households composed of one female and one male earner (with a cross-country average share 
of more than 46 percent), one-male-earner households with an average share of 21 percent, 
and households with three or more earners, with 16.6 percent. The other three groups are less 
prevalent, although households with only one female earner (cross-country average share of 12 
percent) do play, as we shall see below, an important role.  
 
In Figure 4, we take a first look at US labor income inequality within each of these household 
types in comparative context. For each type, the figure indicates the distribution of Gini 
coefficients across 24 countries, the position of the US Gini within that distribution (the solid 
line) and the mean cross-country Gini (the broken line). For example, the Gini for one-female-
earner households ranges from about 0.35 in Slovenia and Italy (country names not shown) to 
just under 0.52 in the US and Canada (see leftmost graph in the upper row). The US Gini, at 
slightly under 0.52, is close to the maximum level of inequality that exists for such households 
in OECD (i.e., it is second to Canada).  
  
                                                          
7 In all three countries, the reason is an unusually high presence of one-female-earner households. 
 
8 When referring to two-earner households, we use the term “traditional” to denote that one of these 
earners is male is one is female (as opposed to two earners of the same gender).  
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Figure 4. Inequality in six main household types,  
(where household types are based on the number and gender of earners) 
 
 
Note: Each graph shows the distribution of Gini coefficients for a given household type across 24 OECD countries. The 
distribution (density) function is a smoothed histogram. The unweighted country mean Gini for 24 countries is shown by the 
dashed line. US Gini is shown by the solid line. The interpretation is as follows: if the US line is to the right of the dashed line, 
this means that US displays (for that particular household type) higher inequality than is usual for OECD countries. The more 
the US line to the right the higher US inequality compared to the rest of OECD. The opposite of course is true when the US line 
is to the left of the dashed line and closer to the beginning of the distribution. Source: see Annex 2. 
 
 
The interpretation is the same for other graphs. The closer the solid line, giving the position of 
the US Gini, to the end of the distribution, the more of an outlier is the US level of inequality. 
(Another way to look at it is to compare the solid line to the broken line, giving the mean Gini 
calculated across countries for a given type of household). For three household types (one-
male-earner, one male and one female earner, and two male earners), the US has the most 
unequal distribution of all countries; for the other three household types, the US distribution is 
the second most unequal.9 In no case, as can be readily checked from Figure 4, is US Gini even 
close to the mean Gini for a given household type, much less lower than it. 
                                                          
9 Note that the Ginis of these various household types differ substantially in these countries. Labor 
income inequality among “traditional” two-earner households is within a rather narrow range between 
0.2 and 0.4 whereas, for example, one-female-earner and one-male-earner households display much 
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Therefore, breaking the overall labor earnings distribution into household types reinforces our 
previous finding: US labor income is very unequally distributed, not only in the aggregate, but 
within each household type we select. 
 
But to confirm this finding, we still need to look at between-group inequality (that is, between 
the six household types). Consider now Figure 5 which is constructed similarly to Figure 4 but 
where we look at the distributions of relative earning levels for a given household type. For 
example, one-female-earner households’ relative earnings10 range from only 45 percent of the 
country mean (in Israel) to 75 percent of the country mean (in Hungary). The broken line, as 
before, shows the median value for the 24 countries (e.g., for one-female-earner households, it 
is 58 percent), and, again as before, the solid line shows the position of the US. Just a glance 
suffices to show that relative group mean earnings in the US are very similar to the median 
values for the 24 countries (with the exception of one-male-earner households whose US 
relative earnings are the second highest of all countries).  
 
In other words, when it comes to the relative earnings of various demographic groups, the US is 
far from being an outlier: groups’ relative earning levels track very closely to other rich 
countries’ averages. This in turn implies that the origin of high labor income inequality in the US 
is not to be found in unusually high earnings of some demographic groups, and unusually low 
earnings of others, but in systematically high earnings inequalities within each individual 
household type.  
  
                                                          
greater ranges of inequality. However, this is not the topic with which we are concerned here. Our 
objective here is find the sources of differences between the US and comparable countries. 
 
10 Note that this is household-size-adjusted (equivalent) labor income. 
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Figure 5. Relative income of six main household types 
 
 
Note: US value: solid line. Mean for 24 countries: broken line. Source: see Annex 2. 
 
 
We confirm our conclusion by looking at Figures 6 and 7 (see the values in Annex 2) that show 
between- and within-group inequalities when individual data for 24 countries are decomposed 
into the six main household types. In Figure 6, countries are ranked by their within-group 
inequality (terms (2) and (3) from equation 1), and the US is far by the most unequal. The Gini 
value of 0.31 for the US implies that even if all mean earnings of the 6 household types were 
exactly equal, the overall labor income inequality would be 0.31. Adding between-group 
inequality does, of course, increase that inequality, but, as Figure 7 shows, the US is far from 
exceptional: its between-group inequality is almost exactly the same as the average for the 24 
countries. 
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Figure 6. Within-group inequality (in Gini points) 
 
Note: countries ranked by within-group inequality. 
 
 
Figure 7. Between-group inequality (in Gini points) 
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We have thus established that US labor income inequality is, together with Israel’s, the highest 
among all of these OECD countries, and that the source of that inequality is not to be found in 
vastly different mean labor incomes across different household types, but in the consistently 
higher inequality with which labor incomes are distributed within each household type. We 
now continue with our investigation by looking in greater detail into three household types: 
one-female-earner households, one-male-earner households, and two earner “traditional” 
households (which contain one female and one male earner). 
 
3. Earnings inequality within one-earner and “traditional” households: 
Further disaggregation by partnership and parenting status 
 
We begin by looking at households that contain only a single earner – one who is female. The 
prevalence of these household across the countries included here is very uneven: at the low 
end are Greece, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic where fewer than 9 percent of households 
contain only one earner, who is female. At the other end (as mentioned earlier) are Ireland, 
Hungary, Russia, and Estonia, which each contain more than 16 percent of households of this 
type. The US falls in the upper range, with the share of one-female-earner households being 15 
percent. 
 
In our next analysis, we divide one-female-earner households into five demographic subgroups, 
corresponding to the households in which they live: couple-headed households with one or 
more children, couple-headed households without children, single-headed11 households with 
children, single-headed household without children, and others. The most common type among 
one-female-earner households in the US, and across the 24 countries included here, is a single-
headed household with children. The next most prevalent types are couple-headed households 
with children (where, by definition, a female is the only earner), and a single-female-headed 
household with children. In the US, these three household types comprise almost 90 percent of 
one-female-earner households. 
 
But is the distribution of labor income in such American households more unequal than in the 
other countries? Figure 8, with the same interpretation as above, provides an answer. In all 
cases, US inequality is greater than the mean inequality among 24 countries, and for single-
headed one-female-earner households with and without children, the US’ inequality ranking is 
fourth from the top. Particularly interesting is the situation of single-headed one-female-earner 
households with children where the US Gini is (a high) 0.48, nearly the same as Germany’s and 
Ireland’s and is overtaken only by Canada’s Gini of 0.56. (The mean Gini across countries, for 
this type of household, is 0.40).  
 
Very high inequality among single-headed one-female-earner households, both with and 
without children, in the US, clearly implies that they are economically and socially diverse. We 
find similar high heterogeneity among single one-male-earner households without children.  
                                                          
11 Throughout this paper, we use the word “single” to mean, exclusively, a person who is not married/partnered. 
We do not use it to refer to the number of earners or persons in a household.  
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Next we look at relative incomes (see Figure 9). The situation here is familiar: US relative 
subgroup mean incomes are not dissimilar from the average situation in 24 countries. The 
differences are minimal (e.g., for a couple with a child, the average labor income is 41 percent 
of US overall mean vs. 45 percent in 24 countries). The only exception is the low income level of 
one-female-earner households with children: their relative income in the US is 40 percent of 
the overall mean while the countries’ average is 50 percent. An ethnic/racial component may 
be important here, as we find (not shown in the graphs) that these households, when headed 
by Hispanics and African-Americans, have mean labor incomes that are only about 30 percent 
of overall US mean.  
 
We now move to one-male-earner households where we keep the same household 
classification as for one-female-earner households. The prevalence of these households varies 
markedly across these countries. At the low end, in Iceland, Denmark, Canada, and Slovakia, 
their share is less than 15 percent. But at the high end, Italy and Greece have more than 30 
percent of one-male-earner households. The US result falls near median with the share of such 
households being 22 percent.12 
 
The results for inequality are familiar (see Figure 10): US households have a much greater labor 
income inequality than in the rest of the study countries, and for two groups in particular 
(couple-headed households with and without children) US inequality is the highest of all. But it 
is among the highest in the other three types of one-male-earner households as well.  
 
Figure 11 indicates the results for relative income. Here again, US relative mean incomes by 
household/demographic type are similar to what we find in other countries with the exception 
of one-male-earner couple-headed households whose relative income is greater than the 
overall US, while in the rest of the counties it is, on the average, some 20 percent below the 
country mean. In effect, the US and Luxembourg have the highest relative income for this 
particular group.  
 
For “traditional” (one male earner and one female earner) households, which comprise the 
largest share of all households, from 40 percent in Hungary and Russia to 55 percent in France 
(US with 42 percent is on the low side here), we look at only two subgroups: “traditional” 
households with, or without, children. US inequality is again very high (see Figure 12): either 
the highest of all countries (for couples with children with a Gini of 0.37 vs. the cross-country 
average Gini of less than 0.3), or the second highest (for couples without children). When it 
comes to relative incomes (see Figure 13), US relative labor income for two-earner households 
with children is almost exactly the same as the mean for 24 countries; it is higher than the 
mean however for couples without children.    
                                                          
12 Note that the share of one-female-earner households across these OECD countries ranges from 8 to 
18 percent. The share of one-male-earner households varies from 15 to 30 percent. The corresponding 
US values are 15 and 22 percent. Thus, neither US value is exceptional.  
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Figure 8. Inequality of 5 subgroups among one-female-earner households 
 
 
Figure 9. Relative income of 5 subgroups among one-female-earner households 
 
Note: US value: solid line. Mean for 24 countries: broken line. Source: see Annex 2. 
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Figure 10. Inequality of 5 subgroups among one-male-earner households 
 
 
Figure 11. Relative income of 5 subgroups among one-male-earner households
 
Note: US value: solid line. Mean for 24 countries: broken line. Source: see Annex 2. 
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Figure 12. Inequality of two subgroups of “traditional” households 
 
Figure 13. Relative income of two subgroups of “traditional” households 
 
Note: US value: solid line. Mean for 24 countries: broken line. Source: see Annex 2. 
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4. Summary and conclusions  
 
High inequality in US disposable income, calculated across households, is not only the product 
of less redistribution in the US as compared with similar OECD countries; it is principally due to 
greater inequality in the underlying market income. The primary component of market income 
is income from labor. In this paper, we have shown that equivalized labor income across 
households is indeed more unequally distributed in the US than in all (but one) of 24 OECD 
countries. Thus inequality in the distribution of labor income goes a long way toward explaining 
inequality of disposable income. 
 
We were also interested in assessing whether labor income inequality is pervasive, across 
household types and demographic subgroups, or whether it may be due to either exceptionally 
high or exceptionally low average labor incomes received by some groups. We conclude that 
within-group inequality of labor incomes in the US is, in almost all cases, high by OECD 
standards. So it is neither an unusual household composition, nor unusually high mean labor 
incomes of some demographic groups that explain high US earnings inequality, but simply the 
fact that high and low labor incomes are universally spread across all household/demographic 
categories. 
 
Table 2 shows that, when we look at individual demographic groups used in the paper, the US’ 
inequality ranking is uniformly high. The average US rank is 2.8, and, in 14 out of 18 cases, US 
within-group inequality is among the three top inequalities. When we look, however, at groups’ 
and subgroup’ relative mean incomes, most of them are quite close to the OECD average. In 
only three cases are US relative labor incomes rather high (one-male-earner households living 
in a couple with or without children, and “traditional” households with no children) and in only 
one case is US relative income unusually low (three-or-more-earner households).  
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Table 2. US inequality and relative income rankings 
(compared to other OECD countries) 
 
 Rankings among 24 OECD countries 
(Top = highest; 24 =lowest) 
Type of household By inequality By relative income 
One-female-earner  2 17 
   Couple w/children 5 8 
   Couple w/o children 4 8 
   Other 6 18 
   Single w/children 3 19 
   Single w/o children 3 9 
One-male-earner  Top 2 
   Couple w/children Top 2 
   Couple w/o children Top 3 
   Other 3 12 
   Single w/children 8 14 
   Single w/o children 4 10 
“Traditional”  Top 8 
   w/children Top 9 
   w/o children 2 5 
Two female earners 2 9 
Two male earners Top 10 
Three + earners 2 20 
Mean of all ranks 2.8 10.2 
 
 
 
To tease out the specificity of US inequality, we estimated regression where the Gini coefficient 
for each country/group is regressed on groups’ relative mean income (i.e., relative to the mean 
of that country) and dummy variables for such groups (15) and countries (24). We are, of 
course, mainly interested in the coefficient on the dummy variable for the US. The results are 
reported in Table 3.  
 
Compared to the omitted country (Denmark, with very low inequality), the coefficient on the 
US dummy is 0.059 and is statistically significant at 0.1 percent. This means that on average (of 
15 family types), US inequality is some 5.9 Gini points greater than Denmark’s. Of all these 
study countries, the US coefficient is the greatest, followed by Canada’s (0.054).  
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Table 3. US income inequality exceptionalism 
(dependent variable: Gini coefficient of household type/country) 
 
Variable Coefficient 
(p value) 
Relative group mean -0.029 
(0.23) 
Three or more earners -0.029 
(0.08) 
Two earners Female 0.023 
(0.17) 
Male 0.035* 
(0.16) 
 
 
One female earner 
Couple with children 0.097** 
(0.00) 
Couple without children 0.054** 
(0.01) 
Other 0.063** 
(0.01) 
Single with children 0.084** 
(0.00) 
Single without children 0.069** 
(0.00) 
 
 
One male earner 
Couple with children 0.090** 
(0.00) 
Couple without children 0.057** 
(0.00) 
Other 0.059** 
(0.01) 
Single with children 0.084** 
(0.00) 
Single without children 0.087** 
(0.00) 
One male one female 
earner 
Couple without children 0.086 
(0.61) 
US dummy 0.059** 
(0.00) 
Adjusted R2 (F) 0.57 
(15.0) 
Number of observations 400 
Note: The omitted family type is one male / one female earner with children, and the omitted 
country is Denmark. Dummy variables for other countries are not shown. 
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Our overall conclusion is that US market income inequality – specifically, inequality of labor 
income – is not an outcome that can be readily addressed by changing the relative economic 
position of persons within selected household groups. High levels of inequality in the US are 
found across all household types; they all contain households with very high and very low labor 
incomes. The generalized policy implication of this finding is that if policy-makers aim to reduce 
US labor (and thus market, and ultimately disposable) income inequality, they need to design 
and implement policy strategies that affect diverse households.  
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Annex 1.  
LIS datasets used 
 
 Name of survey Year 
Australia Household Expenditure Survey (HES) and Survey of Income and 
Housing (SIH) 
2010 
 
Canada Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) 2010 
Czech republic Survey on income and living Conditions / EU-SILC 2010 
Germany German Social Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) 2010 
Denmark Statistics Denmark: Law Model 2010 
Spain Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (ECV) / 
Survey on Income and Living Condition (EU- SILC) 2010 
survey 
2010 
Estonia Estonian Social Survey (ESS) / EU-SILC (Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions) 
2010 
Finland Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC), formerly 
known as Income Distribution Survey (IDS) 
2010 
France Family Budget Survey (BdF) 2010 
UK Family Resources Survey (FRS) 2010 
Greece Survey on Income and Living Conditions / EU- SILC 2011 
survey 
2010 
Hungary Household Monitor Survey 2009 
Ireland Survey on Income and Living Conditions / EU-SILC 2010 
Iceland Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2010 
Israel Household Expenditure Survey 2010 
Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 2010 
Luxembourg Panel socio-économique “Liewen zu Letzebuerg” (PSELL III) / 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2010 
Netherlands Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2010 
Norway Household Income Statistics (formerly based on the Income 
Distribution Survey) 
2010 
 
Poland Household Budget Survey 2010 
Russia Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey-Higher School of 
Economics (RLMS-HSE) 
2010 
Slovakia Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC 2011) 
  
2010 
Slovenia Household Budget Survey 2010 
US Current Population Survey – 
ASEC (Annual Social and Economic Supplement) 
2010 
  
27 
 
 
Annex 2.  
Decomposition in within-group, between-group and overlap Gini components  
(for six household types); all in Gini points 
 
 (1) 
Overall labor 
Gini 
(2) 
Between 
component 
(3)  
Narrow within 
component 
(4)  
Overlap 
(5) = (3)+(4) 
Total within 
component 
Australia 0.357 0.119 0.002 0.236 0.238 
Canada 0.394 0.112 0.003 0.280 0.282 
Czech republic 0.323 0.129 0.002 0.192 0.193 
Germany 0.363 0.109 0.005 0.248 0.254 
Denmark 0.323 0.112 0.003 0.208 0.211 
Spain 0.366 0.136 0.003 0.227 0.230 
Estonia 0.368 0.124 0.006 0.238 0.245 
Finland 0.335 0.103 0.004 0.228 0.232 
France 0.365 0.114 0.006 0.245 0.251 
UK 0.400 0.124 0.004 0.272 0.277 
Greece 0.365 0.127 0.002 0.237 0.238 
Hungary 0.394 0.149 0.011 0.234 0.245 
Ireland 0.430 0.186 0.008 0.235 0.243 
Island 0.330 0.127 0.002 0.200 0.202 
Israel 0.442 0.184 0.003 0.255 0.258 
Italy 0.320 0.149 0.003 0.169 0.171 
Luxembourg 0.366 0.084 0.003 0.279 0.282 
Netherlands 0.336 0.100 0.002 0.234 0.236 
Norway 0.337 0.119 0.003 0.215 0.218 
Poland 0.358 0.135 0.005 0.218 0.223 
Russia 0.368 0.156 0.007 0.205 0.212 
Slovakia 0.311 0.136 0.001 0.173 0.175 
Slovenia 0.277 0.128 0.002 0.147 0.149 
US 0.436 0.125 0.006 0.305 0.311 
Non-US mean 0.361 0.129 0.004 0.228 0.232 
US/non-US 
mean 
1.21 0.97   1.34 
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